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E
rler and Hope conclude that the concept 
of authenticity is a rich one, with a wide 
variety of promising applications in psy-
chiatry and psychotherapy. Nevertheless, they 
acknowledge that there are tensions within the 
concept—most notably, between the ‘true self’ 
account due to Charles Taylor, and accounts due 
to DeGrazia and others, which put more emphasis 
on self-creation and autonomy. If, in invoking the 
concept, a patient might either be trying to capture 
something about the importance of self-creation, 
or trying to capture something about the impor-
tance of discovering/maintaining her true self, or 
trying to avoid self-deception, or trying to work 
out what she really values (Taylor 1991, 36), we 
might reasonably wonder how much value such 
an endlessly flexible concept can really have. A 
more integrated (and thus more useful) concept 
of authenticity can be found in the tradition of 
post-Kantian European philosophy with which 
the concept originates. In particular, it is with 
reference to the primarily Hegelian notion of the 
historicity of the self that the real integrity of the 
concept can be grasped.
The most influential philosophical accounts of 
authenticity implicitly reject both the idea that the 
self could be entirely self-created, and the idea that 
the self could be entirely the object of discovery. 
Heidegger and Sartre disagree on many points, but 
they agree on the idea that the historicity of the self 
should be conceived in terms of thrown projection. 
Thrownness (Heidegger, 1927/1962, § 29) refers 
to the contingency of our physical and cultural 
circumstances, and their recalcitrance in the face 
of our projects and strivings. Our particular spa-
tial, temporal, social, and cultural location in this 
world is something we did not choose. That I am 
the son of my parents may be a necessary truth. 
But there was no necessity that I should be born 
at all, or that I would be born when and where I 
was born. My life as it has been lived is a result of 
innumerable contingencies, with respect to which 
I have never exercised complete control.
At the same time, it is an evident feature of 
this life that I make decisions in it and about it. I 
find myself with projects, and it is in light of these 
projects that I am able to make decisions. (Equally, 
when I find myself unable to decide, it is in light of 
my projects that I am paralyzed with indecision.) 
These projects were never simply chosen. They 
grew out of, and into, other projects—in a pro-
cess that began earlier than my earliest memories. 
When I decide I project into the future, or into pos-
sible futures, and the projective character of choice 
contributes to the distinctive temporal character 
of my existence (Heidegger, 1927/1962, §31). Just 
as in a melody each note is inflected both by those 
that preceded it and those that are anticipated, so 
human existence as thrown-projection is inflected 
at every moment by a specific past and at least one 
possible future.
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Where existence has the above character, au-
thenticity cannot be either a matter of sheer self-
discovery or sheer self-creation. For the self to be 
simply the object of discovery, it would have to be 
the case that my projects were simply discovered, 
and of course this is not the case—those projects 
are laced at every turn with decisions that I make. 
On the other hand, for the self to be simply the 
object of self-creation, it would have to be projec-
tion without thrownness—in a kind of year zero 
of the self, at which all clocks were reset, and we 
were free to choose outside of all ‘situations.’ On 
the view of the self as thrown-projection, authen-
ticity involves avoiding the kind of ‘bad faith’ 
implicit in such views. For Sartre, there are equal 
and opposite failures in (1) the failure to acknowl-
edge the facts of our situation (c.f. his example of 
the woman seduced, who closes her eyes to the 
seducer’s actions, pretending that they are not re-
ally happening [Sartre, 1943/1991, part 1, chapter 
2, § II]), and (2) the failure to acknowledge that, 
as thrown-projection, we nevertheless transcend 
this situation (the example of the waiter, who 
effectively reduces himself to his role, implicitly 
denying that he could be something other than a 
waiter [Sartre, 1943/1991, part 1, chapter 2, § II]). 
Thus understood, authenticity could be conceived 
as a mean between the twin vices of regarding 
oneself as essentially an object to be discovered 
and regarding oneself as free to be whatever one 
chooses to be.
It might be responded that the target is impos-
sible to hit: the line between the two alternatives is 
vanishingly thin, and in fact the way one lives one’s 
life must be marked inevitably by one or other 
of the above vices (we are doomed to emphasize 
‘facticity’ at the expense of ‘transcendence,’ or 
vice versa). To see our way around this problem, 
it is helpful to consider Heidegger’s portrayal of 
authenticity, in which authenticity is unequivocally 
an achievement (Heidegger, 1927/1962, §27). Au-
thenticity is the outcome of a struggle to free one-
self from the ‘they-self’—the self that is entangled 
in the viewpoints and judgments of others, in such 
a way that its decisions are never properly its own. 
Authenticity of this type is possible because neither 
the projects we engage in, nor the view of reality 
that forms the background to them, need be taken 
over at second hand from others. This highlights 
a key dimension of our thrown-projection: we 
do not simply live thrown-projection, we seek to 
understand ourselves and the world into which 
we are thrown—and we may do so authentically 
or inauthentically. Without this self-interpretive 
element, the historicity of the self is incomplete.
Making allowance for the self-interpretive ele-
ment in authenticity may seem to push us in the 
direction of a narrative view of the self (Taylor 
1989, 47) and this in turn may seem to push 
us back in the direction of a self-creation view. 
Nevertheless, a historical conception of the self 
can correct the tendency of narrative views of 
the self to overemphasize self-creation. History 
is, of course, a type of narrative. But the object 
of a historical narrative is not a fiction. The self 
as the object of a historical narrative would be 
constrained by the facts in a way that the self as 
object of mere narrative need not be.
With this the pendulum may seem to swing 
back too far toward the self-discovery view: his-
tory aims to discover the facts, and provide a 
faithful narrative of them (within the familiar con-
straints that apply to any narrative). But ‘history’ 
has a dual sense. On the one hand it refers to the 
unfolding sequence of human actions leading up 
to the present. On the other hand it refers to the 
narrative of those actions. A historical narrative 
of the self must be historical in both senses. On 
the one hand it is straightforwardly an attempt to 
give an account of a life that is being lived. On the 
other hand, it is an event in that life. Human be-
ings not only write history, they also make history; 
and every account of history is in its own small (or 
sometimes large) way a historical event. (It might 
equally be said that historical events are contribu-
tions to the writing of history. When a public figure 
makes a significant decision, she will always have 
at least half an eye on how she will be viewed by 
posterity. The first historian of the event, we might 
say, is the historical agent herself—just as in our 
own lives we can reasonably be said to be the first 
historians of our own actions, when we reflect on 
how they will be interpreted by others.) Thus, the 
resolution of the tension between self-creation and 
self-discovery is built into the historical view of the 
self from the start: a contribution to the history 
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of the self is always both an attempt to faithfully 
record that self, and an original act of self-creation.
There is, however, a final dimension of au-
thenticity to be taken into account: that of the 
contributions of others to one’s historical narra-
tive. The first historian of J. Smith was not Smith 
himself but—in all probability—his parents (we 
do not announce our own birth!). Somehow we 
must properly incorporate the contributions of 
others into our histories. Our narrative does not 
just aim to be faithful to the facts, it also aims to 
be faithful to our sources—and being faithful to 
our sources may well mean deferring to them in 
areas in which they have greater knowledge.
Once the historicity of human existence is taken 
into account, the apparent tensions in the concept 
of authenticity seem to resolve themselves. In the 
production of the historical narrative of our own 
existence we must aim to be (1) faithful to the proj-
ects that animate that existence, (2) faithful to the 
facts, (3) faithful to ourselves in being the authors 
of our own histories, and (4) faithful to the sources 
on which we draw, whose authority might outstrip 
ours on many points. This account is compatible 
with Charles Taylor’s view of authenticity, which 
is premised on the idea that “There is a certain 
way of being human that is my way” (Taylor 
1991, 28–9). But on this view, it is as the author 
of my own history that I may discharge my role 
authentically, or not. Against this background, a 
patient who is concerned whether consenting to 
treatment is compatible with authenticity need not 
be interpreted as presenting us with a version of 
the self-discovery versus self-creation conundrum. 
Rather, she can be seen as seeking advice on how 
to make sense of herself—essentially, on how to 
continue her own (hi)story.
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